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EXAMINING JURORS: APPLYING
CONVERSATION ANALYSIS TO VOIR DIRE
IN CAPITAL CASES, A FIRST LOOK
BARBARA O’BRIEN, CATHERINE M. GROSSO
& ABIJAH P. TAYLOR

∗

Scholarship about racial disparities in jury selection is extensive, but
the data about how parties examine potential jurors in actual trials is limited.
This study of jury selection for 792 potential jurors across twelve randomly
selected North Carolina capital cases uses conversation analysis to examine
the process that produces decisions about who serves on juries. To examine
how race influences conversations in voir dire, we adapted the Roter
Interaction Analysis System, a widely used framework for understanding the
dynamics of patient–clinician communication during clinical encounters, to
the legal setting for the first time. This method allows us to document the
conversational dynamics of actual questioning of potential jurors that
precedes the decision to seat or strike a juror, or to excuse her for cause.
Our preliminary analysis of this uniquely rich archival data suggests ways
in which the discourse of jury selection varies by race, and provides the
foundation for future work looking at the ways in which the evaluation of
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fitness for jury service itself is skewed and contributes to racial disparities in
jury selection.
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Figure 1. Conversation Profile by Race, the Case of John Badgett
INTRODUCTION
While scholarship about jury selection is extensive, the data about how
parties examine potential jurors in actual trials is limited.1 This study goes
behind the outcomes of peremptory strike decisions documented in our
earlier work to examine the process that produces those decisions.2 We use
conversation analysis to document the questioning of potential jurors that
precedes the decision to seat or strike a juror, or to excuse her for cause. Our
preliminary analysis of uniquely rich archival data suggests ways in which
the discourse of jury selection varies by race, and begins to suggest that the
evaluation of fitness for jury service itself is skewed and contributes to racial
disparities in jury selection. This article provides the foundation for future
work in that promising vein.
Jury selection unfolds in stages. The judge and sometimes the attorneys
first question potential jurors to establish their ability to be fair. Any juror
who cannot be fair will be excused. Jurors next face peremptory challenges
by both parties. Parties may dismiss potential jurors with a peremptory
challenge for any reason or no reason at all, except race or gender. In this
way, the parties feel confident that the system is fair.3
The process has, however, been plagued by racism. In Batson v.
Kentucky, the Court issued a clear constitutional prohibition against
consideration of race in strike decisions, holding that purposefully excluding
people from jury service based on race was unconstitutional and undermined
public confidence in the justice system.4 The Batson Court built on a
1

A significant body of experimental work has looked at the role of race in mock jury
selection. For a review, see Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Race and Jury
Selection: Psychological Perspectives on the Peremptory Challenge Debate, 63 AM. PSYCHOL.
527, 527 (2008). Anecdotal evidence of discrimination also exists. In a 1986 training video,
for example, Philadelphia prosecutor Jack McMahon emphasized the importance of striking
certain kinds of jurors, such as “blacks from low-income areas” and blacks who are “real
educated.” David C. Baldus, George Woodworth, David Zuckerman & Neil Alan Weiner, The
Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A Legal and Empirical Analysis,
3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3, 41–43 (2001) (citing Jury Selection with Jack McMahon, 1986
(transcript of DATV Productions video tape, n.d.)) [hereinafter Baldus et al.].
2
Catherine M. Grosso & Barbara O’Brien, A Stubborn Legacy: The Overwhelming
Importance of Race in Jury Selection in 173 Post-Batson North Carolina Capital Trials, 97
IOWA L. REV. 1531 (2012).
3
NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 89–90, 93–95
(2007) (describing this aspect of jury selection).
4
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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significant line of cases seeking to make juries more inclusive.5
Nevertheless, strong evidence suggests that improper factors continue to play
a role in jury selection.6 While the Supreme Court established an elaborate
three-step process for challenging a strike as based on race, parties can readily
defeat the challenge in the third step by proffering a plausible race-neutral
reason for the strike decision.7 Trial courts rarely reject these reasons as
disingenuous or “pretextual.”8
The Batson regime suffers from a major design flaw as it was intended
to counter intentional discrimination.9 Accordingly, attorneys strongly deny

5

See generally Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) (holding that a defendant could
raise a claim that the prosecutor had discriminated in jury selection if he or she could show
systematic evidence of discrimination in selecting trial juries); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303 (1880) (holding that the West Virginia statute limiting jury service to whites violated
the Constitution).
6
See, e.g., Baldus et al., supra note 1, at 121–30 (summarizing findings concluding that
venire member race was “a major determinant in the use of peremptory challenges by both
prosecutors and defense counsel” in Philadelphia County capital murder trials); Grosso &
O’Brien, supra note 2, at 1554 (presenting the results of a fully controlled logistical model
showing that qualified black jurors face odds 2.48 higher than all other jurors of being struck);
Mary R. Rose, The Peremptory Challenge Accused of Race or Gender Discrimination? Some
Data from One County, 23 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 695, 697–99 (1999) (finding that race played a
significant role in the exercise of peremptory challenges by both prosecutors and defense
counsel in one county in North Carolina); Billy M. Turner, Rickie D. Lovell, John C. Young
& William F. Denny, Race and Peremptory Challenges during Voir Dire: Do Prosecution and
Defense Agree?, 14 J. CRIM. JUST. 61, 63 (1986) (presenting findings showing that race played
a significant role in the exercise of peremptory challenges in Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana)
[hereinafter Turner et al.]; see also Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1747–56 (2016)
(reviewing the record of discrimination in the selection of Foster’s jury).
7
A party raising a Batson challenge must first establish a prima facie case of intentional
discrimination by offering evidence that the prosecutor used peremptory strikes to exclude
potential jurors because of their race or gender. If the prima facie case is established, the
prosecutor must provide a neutral explanation for the strike decisions at issue. The proffered
explanation must be more than a bare assertion of good faith, but it need not be a compelling
reason or one that impacts members of all races evenly. The trial court must then determine
whether the proffered reason was genuine or merely a pretext for racial discrimination. Snyder
v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 278 (2005); Batson,
476 U.S. at 93–99.
8
See Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 278 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Jeffrey Bellin & Junichi P.
Semitsu, Widening Batson’s Net to Ensnare More than the Unapologetically Bigoted or
Painfully Unimaginative Attorney, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1116–30 (2011); Kenneth J.
Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and Peremptory
Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 483–84 (1996).
9
See Vidmar & Hans, supra note 3, at 97 (describing the procedure outlined by the
Supreme Court in Batson and noting that an attorney must assert that she believes the other
side has removed a juror on the basis of race to raise a challenge).
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any suggestion that they engage in intentional discrimination.10 This may or
may not be true. Substantial social-psychological evidence supports the
possibility that people—including prosecutors, defense counsel, and
judges—harbor stereotypes about race that bear on people’s attractiveness as
jurors.11 Evidence also suggests that both prosecutors and defense counsel
use race as a proxy for bias, despite the constitutional prohibition.12 In these
instances, voir dire may serve as a tool to develop race-neutral justifications
for the anticipated race-based strikes.
Significant psychological research suggests that racial bias also operates
below the level of conscious awareness to affect people’s perceptions and
behaviors.13 In these instances, stereotypes about which demographic groups
are more or less likely to convict and ultimately sentence a defendant to death
operate as an implicit starting hypothesis that informs how they collect
information during the voir dire process.14 The information collected then
reinforces the stereotype and increases the likelihood that racial stereotypes
influence strike decisions.15
Either way, the voir dire process might contribute to the improper
influence of race. This research project seeks—in time—to document that
contribution as part of a larger effort to limit the influence of race on jury
selection. We coded the process of jury selection for 792 potential jurors
10

See, e.g., Transcript of Closing Argument at 2590–92, State v. Robinson, 368 N.C. 569
(2012) (No. 91 CRS 23143).
11
Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Mapping the Racial Bias of the White Male Capital Juror:
Jury Composition and the “Empathic Divide,” 45 L. & SOC’Y REV. 69, 71–72 (2011); Neil A.
Rector, R. Michael Bagby & Robert Nicholson, The Effect of Prejudice and Judicial
Ambiguity on Defendant Guilt Ratings, 133 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 651, 652 (1993); Laura T.
Sweeney & Craig Haney, The Influence of Race on Sentencing: A Meta-‐Analytic Review of
Experimental Studies, 10 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 179, 182 (1992).
12
See e.g., Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1755 (2016) (discussing evidence that
prosecutors targeted black jurors for exclusion and sought to seat as few black jurors as
possible); see also Baldus et al., supra note 1, at 41 n.133.
13
Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled
Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY& SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 6 (1989); Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping,
Prejudice, and Discrimination, in THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357, 357–411
(Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske & Gardner Lindzey eds., 4th ed. 1998).
14
See Fiske, supra note 13, at 362; Lucy C. Johnston & C. Neil Macrae, Changing Social
Stereotypes: The Case of the Information Seeker, 24 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 581 (1994); Mark
Snyder & William B. Swann, Hypothesis-Testing Processes in Social Interaction, 36 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1202, 1202 (1978).
15
See Andrew R. Todd, Adam D. Galinsky & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Perspective Taking
Undermines Stereotype Maintenance Processes: Evidence from Social Memory, Behavior
Explanation, and Information Solicitation, 30 SOC. COGNITION 94, 96 (2012) [hereinafter
Todd et al.].

O’BRIEN ET AL.

692

10/10/17 5:44 PM

O’BRIEN, GROSSO & TAYLOR

[Vol. 107

across twelve randomly selected North Carolina cases in which the defendant
received the death penalty.16 We coded these conversations according to a
rigorously tested method of conversation analysis in which every complete
thought expressed receives a discrete pre-defined code.17
In this article, we explain how we adapted this methodology to jury
selection, and then present an overview of the data. In Part I, we review the
evidence that despite the Supreme Court’s clear prohibition, race continues
to matter in jury selection and explain why this may be so in light of the
psychological processes at work. Part II reviews the history of conversation
analysis. Part III explains the theory and details of the purposive sample
frame. It then explains how we adapted the conversation coding methodology
to this project and provides coding details. In Part IV, we present our sample
and offer a closer look at ways in which the coding scheme can be used in
analysis. In Part V, we discuss the implications of these patterns and future
avenues of research.
I. RACE DISCRIMINATION AND JURY SELECTION
Despite the Supreme Court’s efforts in Batson to curb racial bias in the
use of peremptory strikes, stark racial disparities persist.18 While racism
continues to influence jury selection,19 the disparities also arise from other
more-subtle psychological processes.20
A. DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION

Jury selection involves two distinct reviews of potential jurors.21 First,
a trial judge should remove any potential juror for “cause” if there is evidence

16

See infra IV for an explanation of how we selected the sample of cases to analyze.
Public health researchers originally developed this system to analyze communication
in healthcare settings. Debra L. Roter & Susan Larson, The Relationship Between Residents’
and Attending Physicians’ Communication during Primary Care Visits: An Illustrative Use of
the Roter Interaction Analysis System, 13 HEALTH COMM. 33, 34 (2001).
18
476 U.S. 79 (1986); see also supra note 6 (collecting studies showing the influence of
race in jury selection).
19
See, e.g., Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1744–45 (2016) (documenting
prosecutors’ explicit references to potential jurors’ race and suitability for jury service);
Baldus et al., supra note 1, at 41 n.133.
17

20

See generally Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 1016 (1988) (analyzing the influence of unconscious racism in charging,
sentencing, and jury selection).
21
North Carolina law provides an example of the process described in this paragraph. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1212 (2009).
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that the juror cannot be impartial and follow the judge’s instructions.22 There
is no limit to the number of jurors who may be removed for cause, but the
basis for doing so must be explicit and fall within specific categories relating
to the juror’s fitness to serve (e.g., pre-existing opinions about the case or a
relationship with one of the parties).23 Second, each party may peremptorily
remove, or “strike,” a limited number of potential jurors for any reason other
than race or gender, and typically without explanation.24 While each review
serves a well-established purpose of ensuring a fair and unbiased jury, the
discretion afforded parties in exercising their peremptory strikes heightens
the risk that improper factors such as race will influence decision making.25
Although consideration of race in strike decisions is constitutionally
prohibited, research in both law reviews and social science journals indicates
that race continues to play a role.26 The difficulty of uncovering racial bias—
whether deliberate or unconscious—has led many to conclude that the Batson
regime cannot counter discrimination in jury selection.27 Many scholars and
several judges have called for the wholesale abolition of peremptory strikes.28
22

See, e.g., North Carolina v. Wilkinson, 474 S.E. 375, 397 (1996) (noting that the
“primary goal of the jury selection process is to ensure selection of a jury comprised only of
persons who will render a fair and impartial verdict” and that removal for cause is appropriate
if the juror is unable to render a verdict in accordance with the law) (quoting North Carolina
v. Conaway, 453 S.E.2d 824, 839 (1995)).
23
See, e,g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1212(5) & (6).
24
See, e,g., id. at § 15A-1217; J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (extending
Batson’s prohibition on race-based peremptory strikes to gender); Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (noting that a prosecutor may generally strike a potential juror for any
reason but race).
25
See generally Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of
Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13 (1998) (analyzing the risks of discrimination by
prosecutors or police officers when they have heightened discretion and proposing reforms
that would limit discretion); Johnson, supra note 19, at 1019 (discussing Justice Powell’s
observation that the “multiplicity of factors that enter sentencing decisions and the consequent
need for discretion may make the inference of race-based decisionmaking riskier in the
sentencing context than where only a few permissible considerations enter into a decision”)
(citing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987)).
26
See, e.g., Baldus et al., supra note 1, at 121–30; Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 2, at
1554; Rose, supra note 6, at 697–99; Turner et al., supra note 6, at 63.
27
See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 102 (Marshall, J., concurring); Edward S. Adams &
Christian Lane, Constructing a Jury That Is Both Impartial and Representative: Utilizing
Cumulative Voting in Jury Selection, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 703, 706–07 (1998); Alan Raphael,
Discriminatory Jury Selection: Lower Court Implementation of Batson v. Kentucky, 25
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 294, 349 (1989).
28
Batson, 476 U.S. at 102 (Marshall, J., concurring); see generally Albert W. Alschuler,
The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury
Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153 (1989); William G. Childs, The Intersection of Peremptory
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Others have suggested changes to the Batson regime, such as reducing the
number of peremptory strikes available to each side, so as to limit the
opportunity for discrimination.29
While scholarship about peremptory challenges is extensive, data about
how parties exercise these challenges in trials is limited. A significant body
of experimental work has examined the role of race in mock jury selection.30
Anecdotal evidence of discrimination also exists. In a 1986 training video,
for example, Philadelphia prosecutor Jack McMahon emphasized the
importance of striking certain kinds of jurors, such as “blacks from lowincome areas” and blacks who are “real educated.”31
Only a handful of published studies, however, have examined how
parties strike jurors in actual trials. Every study of which we are aware found
substantial racial disparities in both prosecutorial and defense use of
peremptory challenges.32 In a previous article, we presented evidence of
racial disparities in jury selection in 173 North Carolina cases in which the
defendant was sentenced to death. 33 We found that prosecutors in North
Carolina capital cases between 1990 and 2010 exercised peremptory
challenges against black potential jurors at twice the rate as jurors of other
Challenges, Challenges for Cause and Harmless Error, 27 AM. J. CRIM. L. 49 (1999); Morris
B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial Judge’s Perspective, 64
U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 810 n.2 (1997) (listing judges and academics who have voiced strong
concerns about peremptory challenges); Vivien Toomey Montz & Craig Lee Montz, The
Peremptory Challenge: Should It Still Exist—An Examination of Federal and Florida Law, 54
U. MIAMI L. REV. 451 (1999); Arielle Siebert, Batson v. Kentucky: Application to Whites and
the Effect on the Peremptory Challenge System, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 307 (1998);
Amy Wilson, The End of Peremptory Challenges: A Call for Change through Comparative
Analysis, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 363 (2009).
29
Adams & Lane, supra note 27, at 739–62; Nathan Koppel, Three Strikes and You’re
Out? Critics Seek Juror-Dismissal Cap, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Mar. 5, 2009, https://	
  
www.wsj.com/articles/SB123621836517136247 [https://perma.cc/S36B-FG4A] (quoting
Iowa law professor David Baldus calling for a three strike limit).
30
For a review, see Sommers & Norton, supra note 1, at 527 for a review.
31
Id.
32
See Baldus et al., supra note 1, at 121–30; Rose, supra note 6, 697–99; Turner et al.,
supra note 6, at 63.
33
See generally Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 2. This finding was the basis of a North
Carolina court’s grant of relief to vacate the death sentence of Marcus Robinson and resentence
him to life in prison (Order Granting Appropriate Relief at 44-46, State v. Robinson, 91-CRS23143 (Sup. Ct. N.C. Apr. 20, 2012) and subsequent grant of relief to three more defendants
on December 13, 2012 (Order Granting Motions for Appropriate Relief at 2, State v. Golphin
et al., 97-CRS-47314-15 (Sup. Ct. N.C. Dec. 13, 2012)). The North Carolina Supreme Court
remanded both decisions for new hearings on December 18, 2015. The court found procedural
errors in each decision. State v. Robinson, 780 S.E.2d 151, 151 (2015); State v. Augustine et
al., 780 S.E.2d 552, 552 (2015).
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races, even after controlling for alternative grounds for removal.
We are not aware of any studies that have examined racial disparities
and the process of voir dire. In fact, very few studies have focused on voir
dire.34 Most studies in this area focus on the structure of voir dire, such as
the relative benefit of judge versus attorney questioning or of individual
versus group questioning of jurors.35 Cathy Johnson and Craig Haney
surveyed potential jurors and observed the process of voir dire in four felony
trials.36 The researchers then coded voir dire transcripts for personalbiographical content and various kinds of instructional communications
about the jury system and the role of jurors to evaluate the effectiveness of
jury selection by either the prosecution or defense in identifying ideal
jurors.37 Their focus, however, was on the structure of voir dire and its
outcomes in light of frequent criticisms that the process is unduly long and
misused by attorneys who seek to indoctrinate potential jurors. At least one
other study has evaluated how the process of voir dire socializes jurors,38 but
we are unaware of any that examine nuanced differences in questioning
pertaining to observed racial disparities.
B. STEREOTYPES AND RACIAL BIAS

A body of psychological literature indicates that decision makers tend
to seek and interpret information in ways that will support existing
hypotheses.39 In the context of stereotyping, this phenomenon is known as
stereotype maintenance.40 Psychologists have demonstrated the impact of
confirmation biases and information seeking behavior in experimental
settings.41 We are not, however, aware of any research that has replicated
34

Cathy Johnson & Craig Haney, Felony Voir Dire: An Exploratory Study of Its Content
and Effect, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 487, 487 (1994) (noting that voir dire has seldom been
studied).
35
See VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 3, at 89 for a review.
36
Johnson & Haney, supra note 34, at 491.
37
Id. at 491–92.
38
See generally Robert W. Balch, Curt Taylor Griffiths, Edwin L. Hall & L. Thomas
Winfree, The Socialization of Jurors the Voir Dire as a Rite of Passage, 4 J. CRIM. JUST. 271
(1976).
39
Joshua Klayman & Young-Won Ha, Confirmation, Disconfirmation, and Information
in Hypothesis Testing, 94 PSYCHOL. REV. 211, 225 (1987); Raymond S. Nickerson,
Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175,
175 (1998).
40
Todd et al., supra note 15, at 95–96.
41
Barbara O’Brien, Prime Suspect: An Examination of Factors that Aggravate and
Counteract Confirmation Bias in Criminal Investigations, 15 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 315,
318–28 (2009).
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these findings in either experimental or applied research on jury selection. If
such a process is at work when attorneys select jurors, a pre-existing belief
about whether a potential juror is likely to favor or disfavor the prosecution
or the defense will influence the discourse—namely the line and tone of
examination—that takes place during voir dire.
Confirmation bias is the tendency to support a hypothesis by seeking
consistent evidence while minimizing inconsistent evidence.42 This kind of
bias can lead to testing a hypothesis in a way that is likely to support it,43 or
to searching for new information in a biased or biasing manner.44
Confirmation bias may lead police investigating a crime to focus on
information consistent with the guilt of a suspect, and to minimize evidence
pointing them in a different direction.45 Confirmation bias is not deliberate,46
and can be present even when there is no motivation to prefer a particular
hypothesis.47
Psychologists have also demonstrated that confirmation bias can serve
to reinforce stereotypes. Stereotypes are categorizations that allow people to
both process information more efficiently and to generate hypotheses about
how members of a particular group are likely to think and behave.48 This
efficiency, however, comes at a cost in that it can lead perceivers to relegate
their targets to caricatures, and also because these perceptions are often
resistant to disconfirming information.49
There are several mechanisms at work in maintaining stereotypes.50 One
stereotype maintenance process particularly relevant in the voir dire context
42

Nickerson, supra note 39, at 175.
Klayman & Ha, supra note 39, at 225.
44
See generally James Friedrich, Primary Error Detection and Minimization (PEDMIN)
Strategies in Social Cognition: A Reinterpretation of Confirmation Bias Phenomena,
100 PSYCHOL. REV. 298 (1993); Dieter Frey, Recent Research on Selective Exposure to
Information, 19 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 41 (1986); Eva Jonas, Stefan
Schulz-Hardt, Dieter Frey & Norman Thelen, Confirmation Bias in Sequential Information
Search after Preliminary Decisions: An Expansion of Dissonance Theoretical Research on
Selective Exposure to Information, 80 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 557 (2001).
45
See generally DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
PROCESS (2012); O’Brien, supra note 41.
46
Bryan Gibson, David M. Sanbonmatsu & Steven S. Posavac, The Effects of Selective
Hypothesis Testing on Gambling, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 126, 127 (1997).
47
Nickerson, supra note 39, at 176.
48
C. Neil Macrae, Alan B. Milne & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Stereotypes as EnergySaving Devices: A Peek Inside the Cognitive Toolbox, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
37, 38 (1994).
49
Todd et al., supra note 15, at 95–96.
50
See generally id.
43
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involves the solicitation and interpretation of information.51 People often
seek information that confirms rather than disconfirms what they expect
based on the stereotype they hold.52 Moreover, to the extent perceivers
receive stereotype-inconsistent information, they often seek to reconcile that
information with what they expect to see or otherwise minimize the
stereotype-inconsistent information’s value.53 In other words, the stereotypes
people hold influence the information people seek and how they interpret
new information.54
If attorneys start with the hypothesis that black jurors are more likely to
have experiences and attitudes that would undermine their willingness to
convict and impose the death penalty, and if attorneys act consistently with
research in other domains that shows that people often search for evidence
that confirms rather than disconfirms an initial hypothesis, then we should
observe disparities not only in whom attorneys choose to strike or pass, but
also in how they question jurors. This tendency would undermine not only
the fairness of the process by contributing to racial disparities, but also its
accuracy by skewing the evaluation of fitness for jury service.
Moreover, even people who consciously endorse egalitarian views may
exhibit subtle bias in interracial interactions.55 Psychologists John Dovidio
and Samuel Gaertner call this bias “aversive racism,” and explain that even
people who harbor little or no conscious racial animus still have unconscious
biases that manifest in subtle, unintentional differences in how they interact
with people of other races, particularly “negative decisions in complex
situations in which bias could be attributed to factors other than race.”56
A complex situation in which a number of factors besides racial bias can
justify a decision describes jury selection perfectly. A longstanding criticism
51

Fiske, supra note 13, at 362; Johnston & McCrae, supra note 14; Snyder & Swann,
supra note 14, at 1205.
52
Nickerson, supra note 39, at 176.
53
Todd et al., supra note 15, at 95–96.
54
Galen V. Bodenhausen, Stereotypic Biases in Social Decision Making and Memory:
Testing Process Models of Stereotype Use, 55 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 726, 726–28
(1988).
55
See generally Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, The Aversive Form of Racism, in
PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 1, 61–89 (Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio
eds., 1986); Nao Hagiwara, Louis A. Penner, Richard Gonzalez, Susan Eggly, John F.
Dovidio, Samuel L. Gaertner, Tessa West & Terrance L. Albrecht, Racial Attitudes,
Physician–Patient Talk Time Ratio, and Adherence in Racially Discordant Medical
Interactions, 87 SOC. SCI. & MED. 123 (2013).
56
Louis A. Penner, John F. Dovidio, Tessa V. West, Samuel L. Gaertner, Terrance L.
Albrecht, Rhonda K. Dailey & Tsveti Markova, Aversive Racism and Medical Interactions
with Black Patients: A Field Study, 46 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 436, 436 (2010).
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of the Batson regime is that the second prong, which requires the striking
party to proffer a race-neutral reason for the strike, is too easy to satisfy.57 If
psychological processes like stereotype maintenance and aversive racism are
in fact driving the racial disparities in how prosecutors decide to use their
peremptory strikes, then we should expect to see subtle differences in the
interactions that precede those decisions. We assess those potential
differences through conversation analysis.
II. CONVERSATION ANALYSIS
Conversation analysis describes a group of methodologies that
document interpersonal interactions at a fine level of detail.58 These
methodologies focus on how all parties to an interaction speak and participate
in an exchange.59
Although conversation analysis was initially used to understand
informal interactions, researchers soon recognized its value to analyze
communication in institutional settings.60 In particular, researchers interested
in the dynamics of doctor-patient interactions sought to adapt the method to
that setting.61 One frequently used method of conversation analysis in
clinical settings is the Roter Interaction Analysis System (“RIAS”).62 Debra
57

Bellin & Semitsu state as follows:

[W]e now consider the charade that has become the Batson process. The State may provide the
trial court with a series of pat race-neutral reasons for exercise of peremptory challenges. . . .
Surely, new prosecutors are given a manual, probably entitled, ‘Handy Race-Neutral Explanations’
or ‘20 Time-Tested Race-Neutral Explanations.’ It might include: too old, too young, divorced,
‘long, unkempt hair,’ free-lance writer, religion, social worker, renter, lack of family contact,
attempting to make eye-contact with defendant, ‘lived in an area consisting predominantly of
apartment complexes,’ single, over-educated, lack of maturity, improper demeanor, unemployed,
improper attire, juror lived alone, misspelled place of employment, living with girlfriend,
unemployed spouse, spouse employed as school teacher, employment as part-time barber,
friendship with city council member, failure to remove hat . . . .

Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 8, at 1090 (quoting People v. Randall, 671 N.E.2d 60, 65–66
(Ill. App. Ct. 1996)).
58
John Heritage & Douglas W. Maynard, Introduction: Analyzing Interaction between
Doctors and Patients in Primary Care, in COMMUNICATION IN MEDICAL CARE: INTERACTION
BETWEEN PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS AND PATIENTS 1–21 (John Heritage & Douglas W.
Maynard eds., 2006).
59
Douglas W. Maynard & John Heritage, Conversation Analysis, Doctor–Patient
Interaction and Medical Communication, 39 MED. EDUC. 428, 428 (2005).
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
See generally Richard M. Frankel, Cracking the Code: Theory and Method in Clinical
Communication Analysis, 13 HEALTH COMM. 101 (2001). For a list of articles applying this
methodology, see Resources: Bibliography and Abstracts of RIAS Studies through 2016,
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Roter developed this system through a meta-analysis of research on patientdoctor conversations.63 RIAS provides a way to characterize in a highly
detailed way the verbal interactions that occur in a conversation.64 Coding
categories are determined in advance and tailored to the specific type of
exchange under analysis. The exchange is treated as a process that takes
place through specific acts—i.e., phrases, questions, and answers—that are
amenable to categorization.65
Researchers have used RIAS to analyze racial disparities in patientdoctor communications. For instance, Mary Catherine Beach and colleagues
(including Roter) reviewed recorded visits between doctors and patients, and
coded the conversations for the presence or absence of various factors (e.g.,
verbal dominance, socio-emotional communication, question asking,
information giving) to analyze differences in interactions by patient race.66
Beach and colleagues used RIAS to find that healthcare providers were more
verbally dominant when interacting with black HIV patients compared to
white HIV patients.67 Using the same method, Beach and colleagues found
that healthcare providers engaged in less psychosocial talk with Latino
patients treated for HIV relative to their non-Latino counterparts.68
RIASWORKS, http://www.riasworks.com/resources_a.html (last visited July 2, 2016).
63
Roter & Larson, supra note 17, at 37.
64
See generally Debra Roter & Susan Larson, The Roter Interaction Analysis System
(RIAS): Utility and Flexibility for Analysis of Medical Interactions, 46 PATIENT EDUC. &
COUNSELING 243 (2002).
65
Anssi Peräkylä, Two Traditions of Interaction Research, 43 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 1,
3 (2004).
66
See generally Mary Catherine Beach, Somnath Saha, P. Todd Korthuis, Victoria Sharp,
Jonathon Cohn, Ira Wilson, Susan Eggly, Lisa A. Cooper, Debra Roter, Andrea Sankar &
Richard Moore, Differences in Patient-Provider Communication for Hispanic Compared to
Non-Hispanic White Patients in HIV Care, 25 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 682 (2010) [hereinafter
Differences in Patient-Provider Communication]; Mary Catherine Beach, Somnath Saha, P.
Todd Korthuis, Victoria Sharp, Jonathon Cohn, Ira Wilson, Susan Eggly, Lisa A. Cooper,
Debra Roter, Andrea Sankar & Richard Moore, Patient-Provider Communication Differs for
Black Compared to White HIV-Infected Patients, 15 AIDS & BEHAV. 805 (2011) [hereinafter
Patient-Provider Communication Differs].
67
Patient-Provider Communication Differs, supra note 66, at 809.
68
Differences in Patient-Provider Communication, supra note 66, at 685. For other
examples of research using conversation analysis to examine racial differences in healthcare
provider-patient interactions, see Margarita Alegría, Debra L. Roter, Anne Valentine, Chihnan Chen, Xinliang Li, Julia Lin, Daniel Rosen, Sheri Lapatin, Sharon-Lise Normand, Susan
Larson & Patrick E. Shrout, Patient-Clinician Ethnic Concordance and Communication in
Mental Health Intake Visits, 93 PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELING 188, 190 (2013) (using RIAS
to compare communication patterns between mental health-care providers and patients of the
same racial and ethnic groups to those in which the provider and patient did not belong to the
same group); Edward P. Havranek, Rebecca Hanratty, Channing Tate, L. Miriam Dickinson,
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The adaptation of this system to a legal setting provides unique
opportunities to compare observed racial disparities in analyses of medical
conversations with observed disparities in the courtroom. Like doctor-patient
interactions, the jury selection process involves a clear hierarchy in which
one of the actors (i.e., the doctor, or the judges and attorneys) plays the role
of an expert seeking information from the other partner to the exchange (i.e.,
the patient, or the juror) to make a diagnosis of sorts.69 While the subject
matter and some of the motivations differ, in both instances the party with
greater expertise about the context attempts to assess the other through a
series of questions and follow-up. Neither the series of questions nor the
follow-up is a casual conversation, as both the medical interview and voir
dire have a traditional structure and content.70 In essence, both doctors and
legal professionals are testing hypotheses about the patients or jurors to
determine the best course of action in light of their goals (how to treat an
illness, or whether to strike or pass a juror). In addition, the conversation
serves to educate the patients and potential jurors (providing information
about a health condition and a treatment plan, or explaining the law they will
have to apply as jurors).71
John F. Steiner, Geoffrey Cohen & Irene A. Blair, Effect of Values Affirmation on RaceDiscordant Patient-Provider Communication, 21 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1662, 1663–65
(2012) (using RIAS to measure the effect of an intervention designed to improve
communication between African-American patients with hypertension and their health care
providers). Researchers have also used RIAS to examine the relation between other types of
bias and patient care. See, e.g., Elizabeth D. Cox, Kirstin A. Nackers, Henry N. Young, Megan
A. Moreno, Joseph F. Levy & Rita M. Mangione-Smith Influence of Race and Socioeconomic
Status on Engagement in Pediatric Primary Care, 87 PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELING 319,
320–23 (2012) (using RIAS to examine differences in communication between pediatric
primary care providers and patients based on race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status);
Kimberly A. Gudzune, Mary Catherine Beach, Debra L. Roter & Lisa A. Cooper, Physicians
Build Less Rapport with Obese Patients, 21 OBESITY 2146, 2147–49 (2013) (using RIAS to
show that primary care providers developed less rapport with overweight and obese patients
than with patients of a normal weight).
69
VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 3, at 89 (describing the process of voir dire).
70
B. Mitchell Peck & Meredith Denney, Disparities in the Conduct of the Medical
Encounter, 2 SAGE OPEN 1, 2 (2012); 47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury § 181 (2017) (noting trial court’s
role in supervising the content and structure of voir dire and discretion in limiting topics of
discussion).
71
Compare Peck & Denney, supra note 70, at 1 (discussing the three functions of the
medical interview: data gathering, communicating information, and relationship building),
with JAMES J. GOBERT, ELLEN KREITZBERG ROSE III, JURY SELECTION: THE LAW, ART AND
SCIENCE OF SELECTING A JURY, at § 10:2 (2013–14):
The legal rationale for voir dire is two-fold: 1) to provide the court and counsel with the
information needed to remove for cause jurors who cannot be fair and impartial; and 2) to provide
counsel with information that allows the exercise of peremptory challenges in an informed and
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Researchers involved in the Arizona Jury Study Project used a similar
type of analysis to code the conversations of jurors during their
deliberations.72 Diamond and colleagues coded the conversations that
occurred among jurors as they decided verdicts using video recordings of
their deliberations in actual trials to test the effect of proposed reforms.
Through detailed coding of the content and process of the deliberations, they
were able to examine factors such as relative frequency and length of each
juror’s participation in the conversation, as well as the specific topics
discussed.
The jury selection process is likewise amenable to the kind of rigor and
thoroughness the researchers involved in the Arizona Jury Study brought to
coding the process of jury deliberations. In the next part, we explain how we
adapted the RIAS method to examine how prosecutors talk to potential jurors
in selecting juries for North Carolina capital cases.
III. THE CURRENT STUDY
This study analyzes the process of voir dire in twelve capital murder
cases in North Carolina. Section III.A explains the purposive sampling
scheme and the theoretical reasons for this approach, and provides details of
execution. Section III.B documents the coding process.
A. SAMPLE DESIGN

We selected cases for inclusion in several stages. First, we identified
thirty-four cases from the 173 North Carolina capital cases included in our
prior study where the court had granted a motion for individual voir dire.73 In
these thirty-four cases, the attorneys and judge questioned each juror
separately rather than in a group. Focusing on these cases allowed us to
identify clearly the part of the transcript that is relevant to each targeted juror.
Second, we identified the county of prosecution for each case. The thirtyfour cases with individual voir dire came from twenty-five different counties.
intelligent manner. To ensure that voir dire is effective, counsel should try to elicit as much
relevant information as possible from the jurors. Only then is counsel in a position to determine
which jurors should be challenged. Voir dire also provides a lawyer the opportunity to inform
jurors about the facts, set out the client’s theory of the case, and explain relevant legal principles

and id. at § 10:1 (“It also provides a lawyer a few moments to get to know the jurors, to
establish a degree of rapport, and to tell them about the case they will be hearing.”).
72
Shari Seidman Diamond, Neil Vidmar, Mary Rose & Leslie Ellis, Juror Discussions
During Civil Trials: Studying an Arizona Innovation, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (2003).
73
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1214(j) (2009) (“In capital cases the trial judge for good cause
shown may direct that jurors be selected one at a time, in which case each juror must first be
passed by the State. These jurors may be sequestered before and after selection.”).

O’BRIEN ET AL.

702

10/10/17 5:44 PM

O’BRIEN, GROSSO & TAYLOR

[Vol. 107

Our next step was to draw a stratified sample of twelve cases from this
list that achieved balance in defendant/victim racial combinations, and
diversity of both place and trial participants. To achieve this we sorted the
cases into the following defendant-victim categories: white defendant/white
victim, black defendant/white victim, and black defendant/black victim.74 We
then used SPSS to randomly select four cases from each category.75 We
further stratified so that each case was from a different county, and that none
of the attorneys or judges was involved in more than one case.
In prior research, we examined attorneys’ strike decisions.76 In these
twelve cases, prosecutors struck 50.7% of black jurors versus 21.2% of all
other jurors, a ratio of 2.4.77 In contrast, defense attorneys struck 27.6% of
black jurors versus 56.8% of all other jurors, a ratio of 0.49.78
Here, we shift our attention from the ultimate strike decisions to the
process of making that decision by examining the conversation leading up to
the decision to strike or pass a potential juror. That is, we are interested in
the actual conversation between each targeted juror and the judge, prosecutor,
and defense counsel trying the case. We therefore selected from the twelve
cases in our sample only those potential jurors with particular characteristics
most likely to elicit questioning. Specifically, we targeted jurors who had
(1) expressed reservations about the death penalty, (2) previously been
accused of a crime, (3) indicated that they or a close relative worked for law
enforcement or a prosecutor’s office, or (4) expressed concern that jury
service would impose undue hardship. We targeted these jurors because
these four characteristics strongly predicted prosecutorial peremptory strikes
in our previous research, and they relate to common stereotypes about how
racial groups differ as jurors.79
1. Death Penalty Reservations Subset
Prosecutors frequently argue that race disparities in the exercise of
peremptory strikes arise because black citizens are more likely to oppose the

74

There were not enough cases involving white defendants and black victims to include
this category.
75
In one instance, the selected case had only one black juror. We eliminated this case
and used SPSS to randomly select a new case.
76
See, e.g., Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 2.
77
This difference is statistically significant at p < .001.
78
This difference is statistically significant at p < .001.
79
See Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 2, at 1556, tbl. 5 (presenting a fully-controlled
logistic regression model in which these factors are significant predictors of prosecutorial
strike decisions).
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death penalty.80 While there is empirical support for that generalization,81
controlling for that factor did not substantially mitigate the race disparities in
the RJA Study.82
We found that while the expression of death penalty reservations greatly
increased the odds that a prosecutor would strike potential jurors of any race
(odds ratio = 11.44), black jurors with that characteristic were still
significantly more likely to be struck than a non-black counterpart expressing
similar views.83 Among people who expressed hesitation about the death
penalty, the prosecution passed (that is, declined to strike) disproportionately
more white potential jurors (26.4% non-black jurors with death penalty
reservations passed) than black potential jurors with such reservations
(9.7%).84
Potential jurors in the cases we analyzed expressed reservations about
imposing the death penalty often enough to allow us to examine the dynamics
surrounding questioning about this factor in relation to race and outcome.
Eleven percent of the strike-eligible venire members in the statewide sample
we analyzed expressed some reservation about imposing the death penalty;
about one-third of those jurors were black.
2. Prior Criminal Accusation
Another explanation frequently offered for racial disparities is that black
potential jurors are more likely to have been accused of a crime.85 Those
80

Baldus et al., supra note 1, at 41 n.133; Transcript of Closing Argument, supra note 10,
at 2590–92.
81
John K. Cochran & Mitchell B. Chamlin, The Enduring Racial Divide in Death Penalty
Support, 34 J. CRIM. JUST. 85, 85 (2006); Robert Fitzgerald & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Due
Process vs. Crime Control: Death Qualification and Jury Attitudes, 8 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 31,
46 (1984); James D. Unnever & Francis T. Cullen, Reassessing the Racial Divide in Support
for Capital Punishment the Continuing Significance Of Race, 44 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 124,
125 (2007); James D. Unnever & Francis T. Cullen, The Racial Divide in Support for the
Death Penalty: Does White Racism Matter?, 85 SOC. FORCES 1281, 1281 (2007).
82
See Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 2, at 1554–55, 1556, tbl. 5.
83
Id. at 1556, tbl. 5.
84
Id. This difference is statistically significant at p < .001.
85
See Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 8, at 1096–97 (reviewing commonly proffered reasons
for peremptory strikes and noting the frequency with which prior experience with the criminal
justice system was accepted as a race-neutral reason notwithstanding its disproportionate
impact on specific racial and ethnic groups); Gilad Edelman, Why Is It So Easy for Prosecutors
to
Strike
Black
Jurors?,
THE
NEW
YORKER
(June
5,
2015),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/why-is-it-so-easy-for-prosecutors-to-strikeblack-jurors (arguing that “race is an unfortunate but powerful generalization” because “black
people are more likely to have been targeted or abused by police” and “to be affected by the
extreme racial disparities in arrests, incarceration, and the death penalty”).
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with such experience might be less trusting of police and prosecutors, and
thus be more skeptical of the state’s evidence.86 Indeed, in the statewide
sample, people who had been accused of crimes were more likely to be struck
by the prosecution (odds ratio = 2.1), but even after controlling for this factor,
a pronounced racial disparity persisted (being black increased the odds of
being struck by 2.5).87 Prosecutors were less inclined to strike non-black
jurors with this characteristic (63.8% passed) compared to their black
counterparts (36.7% passed).88
As with death penalty reservations, this characteristic appears frequently
enough in the data to meaningfully examine the dynamics surrounding
questioning about this factor in relation to race and outcome. Ten percent of
strike-eligible jurors in the statewide sample had this characteristic; just over
one quarter of those jurors were black.
3. Hardship Arising from Jury Service
A potential juror who expressed concern that jury service would pose an
undue burden was significantly more likely to be struck by the state (odds
ratio = 3.0).89 This characteristic is also proffered to account for racial
disparities (that is, that due to pre-existing socio-economic inequalities, black
potential jurors were more likely to face hardship through jury service). But
again, race remained a significant predictor of prosecutorial strikes even
when controlling for this factor. Within this category of people sharing this
characteristic the prosecution passed disproportionally more non-black
potential jurors (26.4%) than black potential jurors (9.7%). Of jurors in the
statewide sample, 4.4% had this characteristic, of whom about 15.7% were
black.
4. Employment with Police or Prosecutors
The first three characteristics discussed increased the odds of a state
strike, but examining the questioning of jurors with characteristics that
decrease those odds may also prove valuable. One such characteristic is
employment with police or a prosecutor’s office. Prosecutors were much less
86

See generally Vida B. Johnson, Arresting Batson: How Striking Jurors Based on Arrest
Records Violates Batson, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 387 (2016) (reviewing the practices of
striking jurors based on arrest record and concluding that doing so violates Batson).
87
Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 2, at 1556, tbl. 5. This variable does not include close
relatives of the jurors who were accused of a crime. Both this variable and the broader variable
predict state strikes, but the broader variable would target too many jurors for this project.
88
Data on file with authors.
89
Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 2, at 1556, tbl. 5.
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likely to strike a juror who personally had worked with police or prosecutors,
or who had a close friend or family member who had done so (odds ratio =
.63). In the statewide sample, 18% of jurors had this characteristic; 11% of
those jurors were black.
All four characteristics discussed above—death penalty reservations,
prior criminal accusation, hardship, and employment with police or
prosecutors—are not only strong predictors of prosecutorial strike decisions,
but also appear important to defense counsel. Although we have yet to
construct a fully-controlled model of defense strikes, preliminary analysis
suggests that many of the same factors are at work, but (not surprisingly) in
the opposite direction. For instance, one preliminary model shows that
defense counsel were significantly less likely to strike a juror who expressed
ambivalence about the death penalty (odds ratio = .43). The same pattern
emerged for jurors who have personally been accused of a crime, or who had
a close friend or family member so accused (odds ratio = .62). In contrast,
defense counsel are significantly more likely to strike a juror who had worked
with the police or prosecutors (odds ratio = 4.37). Hardship is the only
characteristic of the four that increases the odds of both defense and state
strikes (odds ratio = 1.6 (defense), 3.0 (state)). Thus, given the importance
of these factors to strike decisions, conversations with jurors who have these
characteristics may provide a window into the decision-making processes of
the parties.
B. CONVERSATION CODING

This study focuses on the substance of voir dire itself in order to
document disparities in the questioning process rather than solely in the
particular content of questions and answers. Our unit of analysis is an
utterance—the smallest part of expression that can be meaningfully coded.90
Utterances are coded for both form and substance. For example, as illustrated
below and in Appendix 1, we distinguish closed from open-ended questions.
Coding categories are both exhaustive and mutually exclusive, which allow
them to function either on their own or as components of other variables.
Separate codes document personal and historical information, as well as
length of voir dire, verbal dominance (who speaks most), and the extent of
individual expression.91 Codes are informed both by prior voir dire analysis
and experimental work on stereotypes and information seeking, as well as

90
91

Roter & Larson, supra note 17, at 35.
Id.
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literature on conversation analysis.92
1. Adapting the RIAS Rubric to Legal Analysis
The first task involved adapting the RIAS coding rubric to the legal
context. The adaptation was often straightforward; in both the medical and
legal contexts, the parties seek and give information and instructions, make
small talk, and express concerns. For instance, a doctor explaining the next
steps in the patient’s treatment plan is analogous to a judge explaining how
the trial will unfold.
There are, however, obvious differences between the two settings. The
lawyers are working as adversaries and are bound by court rules that govern
both what they say and how they say it. We therefore worked closely with
Debra Roter and Susan Larson to determine which medical RIAS codes could
be applied to voir dire conversations without modification, which were
applicable with some modification, and which were simply too specific to the
medical setting to be useful.93 Along those lines, we created codes to capture
aspects of conversation unique to the legal setting, such as arguments about
Batson objections, as well as aspects of the conversation that have special
significance in voir dire, such as assertions of fact versus opinions.
2. Coding & Reliability
The adapted RIAS coding scheme included forty-six mutually exclusive
codes for utterances.94 To code the voir dire transcripts using this system, we
92

See infra Appendix 1 for a complete list of text codes.
For instance, RIAS includes specific codes for biomedical information giving and
counseling, distinct from psychosocial information giving and counseling. The former
involves information specific to the patient’s condition and treatment plan, and the latter
involves broader information about lifestyle. Those precise codes would not apply in the voir
dire setting, but there are other distinctions that are relevant, such as information about the
specific case being tried versus the law more generally.
94
See infra Appendix 1. See, e.g., Lisa A. Cooper, Debra L. Roter, Kathryn A. Carson,
Mary Catherine Beach, Janice A. Sabin, Anthony G. Greenwald & Thomas S. Inui, The
Associations of Clinicians’ Implicit Attitudes about Race with Medical Visit Communication
and Patient Ratings of Interpersonal Care, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 979, 980 (2012) (“This
system assigns each thought the patient and clinician express to mutually exclusive and
exhaustive codes that can be combined to reflect categories of exchange, including functions
of the medical interview.”); Differences in Patient-Provider Communication, supra note 66,
at 683:
93

RIAS analysts assign one of 37 mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories to each complete
thought expressed by either the patient or provider (referred to as an utterance). These categories
can be combined to reflect four broad types of exchange . . . : socio-emotional communication
(including emotional talk, positive talk, negative talk, and social chit-chat), information-giving
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hired law student graduate research assistants with an eighteen month
commitment and invested in extensive training in RIAS coding.95 The
coders, blind to our hypothesis,96 were assigned individual target jurors to
code. Coders began by reviewing an entire voir dire transcript to evaluate
every conversation in which a target juror appears. Conversations with the
target juror were easily identified and separated from other conversations
because these cases all involved individual voir dire. Once the coder
identified every conversation, the coder coded every part of the transcript
relevant to this juror.
Before undertaking coding, every coder completed a multi-day training,
a day-and-a-half of which was taught by an expert in RIAS. We required that
all coding be done by two independent coders until each coder had achieved
reliability and consistency, and held weekly oral reviews to correct mistakes
and to review difficult transcript sections. We also maintained the RIAS
Legal Codebook containing a detailed explanation of each code and examples
of its proper application. Coders had to review this codebook weekly and to
make precise reference to it when raising questions with the project manager.
Coders worked on site under the close supervision of the project manager.
As coding improved, we developed a systematic “spot check” on coding
accuracy. We asked each current member of the team to code several pages
of transcript in preparation for the weekly coding meeting. We ran “spot
check” exercises approximately six times over three months. We then
reviewed the transcript pages together at the meeting, correcting coding, and
providing guidance to improve coding precision.
Finally, we randomly selected twelve juror transcripts for double
coding. This is about 1.5% of the jurors in the study (12/792). This review
analyzed 9,299 lines of code pertaining to approximately 5,870 coding
decisions. We found substantial agreement, with a kappa of .78.

(including biomedical and psychosocial/lifestyle information and counseling), question-asking
(including biomedical and psychosocial/lifestyle questions), and patient activation (such as asking
for the others’ opinions, confirming the others’ understanding, or clarifying one’s own
understanding.
95

We hired separate coders to complete the descriptive information, strike decisions, and
removals for cause to identify all targeted jurors in the study.
96
Coders were typically blind to race, as well, except for a few instances when race was
explicitly mentioned by one of the parties in the transcript. We decided against redacting that
information as doing so would have drawn attention to the issue of race and might have alerted
the coders that we were interested in racial disparities.
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3. Global Affect Rating
Coding of utterances is a fine, micro-level look at the interactions among
the parties in voir dire. To assess the more general tenor of the exchanges,
coders also rated the tone of the exchanges more globally. After each section
of the transcript (that is, when the court handed off the questioning to the
prosecutor, and then to the defense), coders completed a Global Affect
Ratings Code Sheet to note their perceptions of various affective dimensions
of the exchange, such as the parties’ warmth, frustration, nervousness, and
level of engagement. In contrast to the relatively strict rubric of the RIAS
coding explained above, the global affect reports are necessarily subjective.
They capture the coders’ opinions about the tone of the conversation.
Moreover, the use of transcripts instead of videotaped exchanges naturally
limits the ability of the coders to gauge the tone of the exchange.
Nevertheless, transcribed conversations often convey feelings of irritation,
friendliness, and boredom, among others, through cues such as clipped
answers, interruptions, and phrasing.
IV. AN OVERVIEW OF THE DATA
Section IV.A describes the study sample and compares it to the universe
of jurors from which we drew the sample. Section IV.B introduces some
dimensions of the database by demonstrating ways the data can be used to
understand the voir dire process.
A. THE STUDY SAMPLE

Our study includes 792 potential jurors across twelve cases. As noted
in Part III.A above, we did not include the whole venire for these cases.
Rather, we drew a purposive sample in which all the potential jurors in our
study fell into at least one of four target groups: (1) potential jurors with death
penalty reservations (46.0%, 365/792), (2) those who had been accused of a
crime (8.3%, 66/792), (3) those who had connections to police or a
prosecutor’s office (18.6%, 147/792), and (4) those who expressed concern
that jury service would impose a hardship (42.9%, 340/792).97 Table 1,
Column B shows the total venire of the twelve cases, and Columns C–F show
the number of potential jurors in each relevant category that constituted our
sample.
Our prior research focused on strike decisions.98 In this study, we
97

The percentages do not add up to 100% because some potential jurors had more than
one of the targeted characteristics and thus fell into more than one target group.
98
Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 2, at 1533 (explaining the scope of the research).
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expand the analysis to include removals for cause, which is how most
potential jurors in these cases exited the path to serving on a jury, as shown
in Table 2, Column D. Table 2 shows the outcome (seated, struck, or excused
for cause) for the 792 potential jurors included in the study by each of the
twelve cases.
TABLE 1. STUDY SAMPLE BY TARGET GROUP AND CASE
A

B

Case

Total
Venire

14.0
41.0
88.2
103.0
190.0
220.1
256.0
294.0
319.0
327.0
330.0
363.0
Total

67
138
107
65
275
141
90
70
103
118
74
57
1305

C
Death
Penalty
Reservations
11
64
23
17
72
27
20
24
19
51
24
15
367

D
Accused
of
Crime
2
9
5
8
13
10
6
1
1
6
4
2
67

E
Service
is
Hardship
16
18
37
13
106
58
15
14
33
7
7
16
340

F
Knows
Police or
Prosecutor
12
25
14
10
33
13
15
3
8
5
8
3
149

G
Total
Jurors in
99
Study
33
88
73
37
194
93
48
38
57
65
37
29
792

	
  
TABLE 2. STUDY SAMPLE BY JURY SELECTION OUTCOME AND CASE
A
Case
14.0
41.0
88.2
103.0
190.0
99

B
State
Struck
6
9
8
8
13

C
Defense
Struck
5
6
8
6
6

D
Excused for
Cause
19
69
48
16
169

E
Seated
3
4
9
7
6

F
100

Totals
33
88
73
37
194

Column G includes all of the jurors in columns C–F but is not the sum of columns C–
F. A juror may fall into more than one target group (presented in columns C–F), but ultimately
appears only once in the study sample (presented in column G).
100
This column includes venire members selected as alternates.
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220.1
256.0
294.0
319.0
327.0
330.0
363.0
Totals
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11
5
6
7
7
10
6
96

6
7
3
4
3
3
2
59

72
32
26
43
51
20
18
583
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3
6
3
3
5
4
3
56

93
48
38
57
65
37
29
792

Of these potential jurors, 63.5% were white (503/792), 28.5% were
black (226/792), 1.3% were Native American (10/792), 0.3% were Asian
(2/792), 0.1% were Latino (1/792). We are missing race information for 6.3%
(50/792). Women made up 58.3% of the potential jurors (462/792), and men
were 41.7% (330/792). Table 3 shows the outcome for the potential jurors
in the study by race; the racially-disparate strike patterns roughly mirror the
patterns for the full population of venire members in these twelve cases.
TABLE 3. STUDY SAMPLE BY RATE OF STRIKE
AND CAUSE REMOVALS, BY RACE
State Strikes

Black
White

Passed
26.0%
(13/50)
64.3%
(99/154)

Other

0

Unknown

0

Total

53.8%
(112/208)

Struck
74.0%
(37/50)
35.7%
(55/154)
100%
(2/2)
100%
(2/2)
46%
(96/208)

Defense Strikes

Cause Challenges

Passed
81.8%
(9/11)
39.4%
(37/94)

Struck
18.2%
(2/11)
60.6%
(57/94)

0

0

0

0

43.8%
(46/105)

56.2%
(59/105)

Passed
21.7%
(49/226)
31.0%
(156/503)
15.4%
(2/13)
4.0%
(2/50)
26.4%
(209/792)

Excused
78.3%
(177/226)
69.0%
(347/503)
84.6%
(11/13)
96.0%
(48/50)
73.6%
(583/792)

We coded every utterance exchanged by judges, prosecutors, defense
counsel, and other court officials with the 792 potential jurors for a total of
193,869 utterances. As noted above, we selected these jurors for inclusion
because their particular characteristics were most likely to elicit focused
questioning. Every utterance captures a complete thought, but can vary
greatly in length from a one-word response to multiple lines of text
expressing a single thought. Table 4 therefore sets forth not only the average
number of utterances by each potential juror per case (Column C), but also
the average number of characters of text for each (Column D), which
provides a sense of the amount of talk.
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TABLE 4. STUDY SAMPLE BY AVERAGE NUMBER OF UTTERANCES AND
AMOUNT OF SPEECH PER JUROR BY CASE
A

B

C

D

Case

Jurors

Average # of Utterances
per Juror

Average # of Characters
of Speech per Juror

14.0
41.0
88.2
103.0
190.0
220.1
256.0
294.0
319.0
327.0
330.0
363.0
Total

33
88
73
37
194
93
48
38
57
65
37
29
792

246
432
232
256
192
181
395
208
198
166
338
200
245

459,395
799,806
431,777
478,394
351,563
343,197
743,462
394,354
275,690
309,712
626,512
379,400
466,105

This study was based on a purposive sample. Sample details provide
critical foundation for future work. Section IV.A presented details about the
study sample in five domains. First it presented the purposive distribution of
jurors among cases and target groups. It then documented jury selection
outcomes and strike and cause removals rates by race and compared the
sample to the universe in this respect. Finally, it documented the scope of
conversation codes and variance in rate of conversation by case. The next
section shifts attention to the coding scheme.
B. CAPACITIES OF THE CODING SCHEME

While the previous section presented basic information about the study
sample, this section provides details about the capacities of coding scheme.
The first subsection presents analysis using qualities of speech, such as
whether a question is open or closed. Next we consider ways of evaluating
speech in the aggregate to compare the amount different speakers speak or
the ratio between subsets of speakers. This can help evaluate dominance or
variance in treatment. The final subsection demonstrates how conversation
profiles can be used to identify cases for qualitative work. Previous research
on jury selection and charging and sentencing decisions in these cases
provide rich data to complement these analyses.101
101

See generally Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 2; Barbara O’Brien, Catherine M. Grosso,
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1. Qualities of Speech
Coding tags qualities of speech as well as content. Table 5 provides a
simple example of this. The table starts in the least exciting part of the coding
scheme. Basic compound codes mark interactions with very little emotional
content. Basic codes note whether questions are open or closed, whether they
seek or give fact or opinion, and whether they focus on general legal matters,
case specific matters, personal legal matters, or personal matters.
More than 60% of the utterances in the databases are marked with basic
compound codes. For example, if a prosecutor asks a juror, “Do you go to
church?” This would be coded as a “Closed Personal Question.” The
response, “Yes,” would be coded as “Gives Personal Information.” Slightly
different codes focus on the content of speech—general legal, case specific,
personal, or personal legal—in these compound codes. A second set of codes
capture affect more precisely. Imagine the prosecutor prefaced the previous
question with some apologetic language, saying instead, “Please don’t think
I am prying into your personal life, but do you go to church?” The first phrase
would
be
coded
separately,
noting
the
reassuring
tone,
“Reassures/Optimism” and the second as a Closed Personal Question.
Table 5 presents basic counts of utterances by only one aspect of general
compound code—the fact of asking an open or closed question. It
disaggregates this information by voir dire section. Coders identified
sections as they coded; sections follow a pattern. Typically individualized
voir dire begins with the judge explaining the process and the case to a
potential juror. This is the court section. The prosecution follows and holds
the floor while he questions the juror. Finally, the defense counsel takes over
voir dire if the prosecutor is satisfied and passes the juror.102
You can see in Column 3 that generally speaking, most general code
question utterances were made during the prosecutor’s part of voir dire. This
section accounts for 61% of the utterances (23,578/38,854). Defense
counsel, on the other hand, goes last and speaks less. Only 22% of the
utterances were made by defense counsel (6,773/38,854). This pattern holds
across open and closed questions, shown in Columns B and C.
Comparing Columns B and C shows the dominance of closed questions
in voir dire. Ninety-four percent of these questions are closed, a pattern that
holds throughout voir dire. The overwhelming dominance of closed
questions in a context in which the speaker intends to learn about qualified
George Woodworth & Abijah Taylor, Untangling the Role of Race in Capital Charging and
Sentencing in North Carolina, 1990–2009, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1997 (2016).
102
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1214 (2009) (defining jury selection procedures).
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jurors raises general questions about the utility of voir dire. Future research
may evaluate the evidence presented here about how voir dire actually
unfolded in these cases to test the use of best practices in this kind of
questioning.
TABLE 5. PRESENCE OF OPEN AND CLOSED QUESTION CODES BY
VOIR DIRE SECTION ACROSS ALL CASES
A

B

C

Open Questions

Closed Questions

n

%

n

%

1.

Court

336

15%

6,437

18%

2.

Defense

597

27%

7,906

22%

3.

Prosecutor

1,259

57%

22,319

61%

4.

Totals

2,192

36,662

6%

94%

More specific codes document behavior with a higher level of emotional
content. For example, coders watch for a special kind of narrowly defined
leading questions. These codes mark information where the speaker
introduces new information to the juror that would either increase or decrease
the juror’s likelihood of qualifying for the jury. Leading questions often
address the venire members’ opinions about the death penalty. Other codes
document each time a speaker asks for reassurance or ask for understanding.
Analysis of patterns of speech around expressions of empathy or situations
in which an attorney discloses something about himself to the juror (“I play
golf there too”) may tag areas that merit close analysis of the ways
stereotypes influence voir dire speech and limit its value.
2. Moving Beyond Individual Variables to
Look at Patterns or Systemic Variation
The coding system also tracked the amount and order of speech to allow
us to look beyond individual codes at patterns or systems. Previous scholars
have used this capacity to document the amount of talk by speaker or the ratio
of one kind of speech to another.103 In subsequent work we could also use
103

See, e.g., Roter & Larson, supra note 17, at 37 (citing studies where these approaches
have been taken).
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this capacity to analyze the polarity or subjectivity of the language in an effort
to capture emotive content in the highly ritualized context of voir dire.104 Our
data allows us to analyze the amount of talk by each speaker, the sequences
of speech within and between speakers and respondents, and the nature of the
speech.
Calculations of the ratio of talk between medical providers and patients
have been used as an indication of verbal dominance.105 We adapted that
measure here to evaluate the relationship between different speakers and
jurors. Table 6 presents this information for each of the twelve cases in our
study. Each section shows the ratio of the amount of prosecutor, defense
attorney, and judge talk to juror talk for black and other jurors. These
calculations are based on a sum of the number of characters used in the voir
transcript during every utterance by each speaker. We also disaggregated the
data and ratios by gender, but did not see meaningful differences in this level
of analysis. Subsequent work may look more closely at the intersection
between race and gender with respect to verbal dominance.
These ratios presented in Table 6 suggest that the extent of verbal
dominance varies by race (black or other) and actor (judge, prosecutor, or
defense counsel). Looking first at prosecutor speech, the average ratio
between prosecutor speech and juror speech (prosecutor/juror) is 0.92. This
number averages the ratios for prosecutor/juror speech for all jurors in
Column B. Columns C and D present the ratio in amount of speech
disaggregated by race. Column C presents speech ratios for black jurors and
Column D presents ratios for all other jurors. Columns E and F compare the
information in Columns D and E. Column E reports the arithmetic difference
between them (Column C–Column D). Column F presents the ratio between
the columns (Column C/Column D). These measures provide two estimates
of the magnitude of any disparity observed.
Looking first at Column C, in eight of twelve cases the prosecutor
dominates the juror by between 0.20 and 1.5 points more when the juror is
black than when the juror is any other race. The ratio between them varies
from 1.27 and 3.14 across these eight cases. In two cases, the ratio does not
differ meaningfully by race. In the final two, the ratio flips in the other
direction. These two cases are the oldest cases in the study and both involve
black defendants and white victims.
104

See generally Douglas R. Rice & Christopher Zorn, Corpus-Based Dictionaries for
Sentiment Analysis of Specialized Vocabularies, Presentation at the New Directions in
Analyzing Text as Data Workshop: September 27–28, 2013 (Sept. 19, 2013) (preliminary
draft).
105
Roter & Larson, supra note 17, at 37.
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Turning to defense counsel speech, it is noteworthy that the defense
follows the prosecution in capital voir dire in North Carolina and, therefore,
is unlikely to have spoken with any juror that faced a state strike.106 As a
result, defense counsel has less speech overall in the dataset. The average
ratio between defense counsel speech and juror speech (defense/juror) is
0.46. Previous research comparing prosecutor and defense decision-making
in jury selection found that defense counsel struck a higher percent of nonblack jurors than black jurors and, in fact, seemed to operate as the mirror
opposite of prosecutors.107 The mirroring effect is present in ratios in Table
6. The ratio of defense to juror speech with jurors of other races exceeds the
ratio for black jurors in ten of twelve cases. The difference in ratios ranges
from -0.12 to -0.80 (Column E). The ratio goes from infinity (0.57/0) to .06.
The ratios in two cases move in the opposite direction (319 and 330). One
of these is a case in which the prosecutor also switched directions.
TABLE 6. PROSECUTOR/JUROR, DEFENSE/JUROR, AND JUDGE/JUROR
SPEECH RATIOS BY CASE, OVERALL (COL. B)
108
AND BY RACE (COLS. C-F)
A

B

C

D

E

F

All Jurors

Black
Jurors

All Other
Jurors

Difference
(C–D)

Ratio
(C/D)

(n = 33)

(n = 2)

(n = 31)

Prosecutor/Juror

0.63

1.59

0.57

1.02

2.79

Defense/Juror

0.53

0

0.57

-0.57

0.00

Judge/Juror

0.95

0.92

0.96

-0.04

0.96

41 Braxton

(n = 88)

(n = 48)

(n = 40)

Prosecutor/Juror

1.11

1.09

1.13

-0.04

0.96

Defense/Juror

0.50

0.39

0.59

-0.2

0.66

Judge/Juror

0.43

0.53

0.34

0.19

1.56

88.2 Duke

(n = 73)

(n = 6)

(n = 53)

Prosecutor/Juror

0.73

1.05

0.72

0.33

1.46

Defense/Juror

0.56

0.55

0.58

-0.03

0.95

Judge/Juror

0.51

0.41

0.47

-0.06

0.87

14 Badgett

106

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1214 (defining jury selection procedures).
David C. Baldus, George Woodworth, David Zuckerman, Neil Alan Weiner & Barbara
Broffitt, The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A Legal and Empirical
Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3, 51–55 (2001).
108
Not all columns sum because of missing race information.
107
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B

C

D

All Jurors

Black
Jurors

All Other
Jurors

103 Gainey
Prosecutor/Juror
Defense/Juror
Judge/Juror
190 Manness
Prosecutor/Juror
Defense/Juror

(n=37)
.53
0.19
0.70
(n=194)
1.35
0.59

(n=7)
.78
0.07
0.81
(n=61)
1.66
0.28

(n=29)
.48
0.22
0.67
(n=123)
1.25
0.71

Judge/Juror
220.1 AlBayyinah
Prosecutor/Juror

0.32

0.36

0.31

(n = 93)

(n = 8)

(n = 85)

0.81

1.01

Defense/Juror

0.30

Judge/Juror
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E
Difference
(C–D)

F
Ratio
(C/D)

.3
-0.15
0.14

1.63
0.32
1.21

0.41
-0.43

1.33
0.39

0.05

1.16

0.77

0.24

1.31

0.20

0.33

-0.13

0.61

1.10

0.91

1.13

-0.22

0.81

256 Richardson

(n = 48)

(n = 15)

(n = 33)

Prosecutor/Juror

0.70

2.20

0.70

1.5

3.14

Defense/Juror

0.55

0.35

0.49

-0.14

0.71

Judge/Juror

0.99

1.60

0.88

0.72

1.82

294 Stroud

(n = 38)

(n = 14)

(n =23)

Prosecutor/Juror

0.86

0.88

0.85

0.03

1.04

Defense/Juror

0.47

0.36

0.54

-0.18

0.67

Judge/Juror

0.71

0.74

0.68

0.06

1.09

319 Warren

(n = 57)

(n = 4)

(n = 45)

Prosecutor/Juror

0.76

0.93

0.73

0.2

1.27

Defense/Juror

0.39

0.47

0.41

0.06

1.15

Judge/Juror

0.66

0.78

0.62

0.16

1.26

(n = 65)

(n = 45)

(n = 20)

Prosecutor/Juror

1.02

1.10

0.85

0.25

1.29

Defense/Juror

0.26

0.20

0.39

-0.19

0.51

Judge/Juror

0.62

0.65

0.54

0.11

1.20

(n = 37)

(n = 22)

(n = 14)

Prosecutor/Juror

0.85

0.68

0.90

-0.22

0.76

Defense/Juror

0.45

0.54

0.42

0.12

1.29

Judge/Juror

0.42

0.77

0.32

0.45

2.41

327 Williams

330 Williams
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B

363 Thomas
Prosecutor/Juror
Defense/Juror
Judge/Juror

C

717
D

E

All Jurors

Black
Jurors

All Other
Jurors

Difference
(C–D)

(n=29)
1.66
0.75
0.26

(n=3)
1.05
0.02
0.44

(n=26)
1.71
0.82
0.24

-0.66
-0.8
0.2

F
Ratio
(C/D)

0.61
0.02
1.83

Table 6 also reports ratios with respect to judge speech. The average
ratio between judicial speech and juror speech is 0.64. This analysis excludes
any sections where the judge is speaking to a large group of jurors
collectively. The judge speech ratio is higher in voir with black jurors in
eight of twelve cases. It flips in the other direction for two and is equal in
two.
The disparities reported here provide a first look at the way the speakers
interacted with each other with respect to holding the floor. Future work will
allow us to look more carefully at how these disparities appear in different
target groups or in the context of different parts of voir dire conversations.
3. Working with Single Cases, In Depth
This research ultimately seeks to document ways that the voir dire
process itself might contribute to the improper influence of race. While the
data is poised for analysis, the next phase requires identifying patterns of
codes that would help to identify areas where information seeking behavior
may present. We need to hypothesize about what the codes might look like
in these situations. Precisely, we need queries that we can operationalize and
test.
The RIAS coding system lends itself to this part of the process well. By
coding utterances individually, that is coding every complete thought
separately, and by making the codes “mutually exclusive and exhaustive,”
the codes work well as “building blocks” that we can combine “to summarize
the dialogue” with respect to content, tone, or even sequence.109
This subsection presents one example of this kind of work. The analysis
here relied on conversation profiles that we built by grouping individual
codes around function and, to some extent, tone. The profile has four
mutually exclusive components. Use of similar categories in previous RIAS
coded studies provided guidance in defining meaningful components.110
109
110

Roter & Larson, supra note 17, at 37.
See Debra L. Roter , Moira Stewart, Samuel M. Putnam, Mack Lipkin, William Stiles
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Education/orientation speech, the first, includes utterances that provide facts
and information about the law and the case at hand. Data gathering speech,
the second, includes questions about facts and opinions relevant to the
proceedings. Relationship building speech, the third, involves utterances in
which the speaker reaches out to the juror with expressions such as empathy
or approval, self-disclosure, or reassurances. Finally, the fourth, conflict
speech arises when there is disagreement, criticism, or leading questions that
seem designed to control the juror’s response.
We assigned each individual code to a single component by polling our
coders. Our coders had read and coded hundreds of pages of transcripts
before we asked them to do this project. They had developed nuanced
understandings of the codes and the transcripts. Coders assigned each code
to one of the four pre-defined mutually exclusive categories. We then
combined their results into a “conversation profile” with four distinct
components: education/orientation speech, data gathering speech,
relationship building speech, and conflict speech. This profile can be refined
to reflect different speakers and contexts.111
The profile describes what percent of the speech in each case falls in
each component. For example, in the case of John Badgett (14.0), 53% of
speech was spent on education and orientation, 26% on data gathering, 11%
on relationship building, and 12% on conflict. Contrast this with the overall
conversation profile in the case of Lesley E. Warren (319.0) where 63% of
the speech was spent on education and orientation, 28% on data gathering,
only 4% on relationship building, and 5% on conflict. Comparing different
profiles suggests variance the tone of voir dire and perhaps the strategy or
technique of the attorneys.
We also analyzed communication profiles disaggregated by strike
decision (strike versus pass) or by race (black versus white). Figure 1
presents the voir dire conversation profile in John Badgett’s case
disaggregated by race. Each component of the conversation profile appears
in a set of bar graphs. The dark grey bar on the left represents black venire
members. The light grey bar on the right represents all other venire members.
Black venire members in this case face less education and orientation, but
& Thomas S. Inui, Communication Patterns of Primary Care Physicians, 277 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N 350, 351 (1997) (explaining the summary groupings of RIAS codes in a study
analyzing doctor-patient communication as including question-asking, biomedical
information giving, psychosocial exchanges, positive talk, negative talk, social talk,
facilitation, and orientation).
111
See infra Appendix 2 for a definition of the codes included in each category. Note
that this profile assumed a prosecutor as speaker. Subsequent work will prepare profiles by
speaker.
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more data gathering. They participate in fewer utterances that build
relationships and more that reflect conflict.
Similar patterns appear in some of the other cases as well. Without
more, however, it is difficult to know how to interpret these differences. The
next step is to analyze the underlying codes to see if disparate patterns of
questioning underlie the disparate levels of conflict or relationship building
profiles. Complementary research on jury selection and charging and
sentencing decisions in each case in the study and in North Carolina during
the time of the study provide information that can shed light on the voir dire
process and suggest avenues for inquiries within RIAS codes.112
FIGURE 1. CONVERSATION PROFILE BY RACE,
THE CASE OF JOHN BADGETT

For example, we can look at Badgett’s case from multiple angles. We
can consider the facts in the case, charging and sentencing decisions, and jury
selection. Badgett is a white man; he killed Grover Arthur Kizer, a white
man.113 Badgett had a history of substance abuse and violence. This was not
112

See generally Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 2, at 1531; O’Brien, Grosso, Woodworth
& Taylor, supra note 101, at 1997.
113
See North Carolina v. Badgett, 644 S.E.2d 206, 209–11 (N.C. 2006) (recounting the
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his first homicide, or even his first stabbing. He stabbed a man in the throat
before committing this murder and was convicted of voluntary manslaughter.
Some evidence suggests he suffered from psychological illnesses. At the time
of this crime, Badgett was homeless. Kizer, who also suffered from a mental
disability, took him into his house on a particularly cold night. When the
victim became delusional and agitated, Badgett became frightened and
stabbed the victim in the throat with a pocket knife and slashed his arm.
Badgett later stole items and cash from the victim and his home on at least
two occasions before the police began investigating.
The jury found the case death-eligible because of his prior record and
evidence that he committed the murder for pecuniary gain.114 The case file
does not suggest the crime garnered particular attention in the press.115
Earlier research concluded that cases with at least one white victim were
more likely to result in a death sentence than all other cases, even after
controlling for other theoretically and statistically important information
about the circumstances of the crime and the defendant.116 Other than that
legally impermissible factor, this case does not stand out as particularly
aggravated among other death-eligible homicides.117
Despite potentially strong mitigation, the conversations during jury
selection in Badgett’s case largely focused on issues that are fairly standard
in voir dire—the potential jurors’ familiarity with the case and potential
witnesses. Because this was a capital case, the court and lawyers spend a
substantial amount of time on the potential jurors’ attitudes about the death
penalty. However, besides a few questions about the potential jurors’
feelings and prior experiences with mental health professionals, the
conversation focused primarily on general attitudes and the potential jurors’
backgrounds and occupations. Defense counsel’s voir dire strategy
foreshadowed their trial strategy, as they did not present any mitigating
facts of the crime and the trial).
114
Id. at 223.
115
Several local news articles printed several paragraphs each on the murder; none seem
to have placed it on the front page or in the front section. Kathi Keys, Suspect Arrested in
Death of City Man, THE COURIER-TRIB., Dec. 2, 2002, at 2A; Mark Brumley, Ex-Convict
Arrested in Homicide: Records Show John Scott Badgett—Charged with Murder in a Weekend
Homicide—Killed A Man Years Ago, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., B1, Dec. 3, 2002, at B1;
Mark Brumley, Man Charged with Murder in Stabbing: John Scott Badgett, Who Served Four
Years in Prison for Another Stabbing Death, is Accused of Killing Grover Arthur Kiser,
GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., B1, Dec. 5, 2002, at B1.
116
O’Brien, Grosso, Woodworth & Taylor, supra note 101, at 1998.
117
See id. at 2027 (presenting fully controlled logistic regression models documenting
those factors associated with a highly aggravated case in North Carolina during this time
period).
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evidence to the jury at trial. This seems out of step with the kind of defense
representation that would have been standard practice in 2004 when this trial
took place.118
Another issue not raised in voir dire was race, but race is nevertheless
an important backdrop to understanding this case. Badgett’s case was tried in
Randolph County, North Carolina. Randolph County was almost 6% black
at the time of Badgett’s trial.119 The representation of African-Americans was
lower on Badgett’s venire, including only three African Americans among
67 people, 4%. Otherwise, the venire was 94% white (63/67), and 1% other
(1/67).120 Not one of the black venire members in Badgett’s case was excused
for cause. The prosecutor, however, struck two of the three during jury
selection (68%). He struck an even higher number of qualified white venire
members (9), but a lower percent of this group’s total, 26% (9/35), and did
not strike the venire member whose race was “other.” The seated jury
including alternates was 86% white (12/14), including one AfricanAmerican.121
The conversation profiles in Badgett’s case are based on the actual
conversations in voir dire that led to this result but they are limited in that
they offer the broadest possible view of the data. Looking more closely at
information we have about the case and individual jurors in the case may
provide a focus with the RIAS coded conversations. For example, our
previous study documented that the each of the black jurors—the same jurors
struck by the prosecution and included in this study—had characteristics of

118

See ABA Guidelines for Capital Defense, Guideline 10.11(A) (2003), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/death_penalty_represent
ation/2003guidelines.authcheckdam.pdf (“[C]ounsel at every stage of the case have a
continuing duty to investigate issues bearing upon penalty and to seek information that
supports mitigation.”).
119
Population of Randolph County, North Carolina: Census 2010 and 2000 Interactive
Map,
Demographics,
Statistics,
Graphs,
Quick
Facts,
CENSUSVIEWER,
http://censusviewer.com/county/NC/Randolph [https://perma.cc/V2FV-KNYB] (last visited
Aug. 8, 2017).
120
The person coded as other described himself as “other” in the jury questionnaire and
to the North Carolina Board of Elections. We do not have additional information about his
race.
121
In comparison, the purposive sample of venire members with at least one of the target
characteristics was 6.1% black (2/33) and 93.9% white (31/33). None of the black venire
members in the sample were excused for cause, but 61.3% of the white potential jurors were
excused (19/31). Among venire members qualified to serve, the state struck all of the black
venire members in the sample (2/2), and 33.3% of the white venire members (4/12). Three
white jurors from the sample were seated on the jury, and no black jurors in the sample were
seated.
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concern to prosecutors.122
One juror expressed reservations about the death penalty. Not enough
concern to be excused for cause, but enough that her transcript includes
questions about her opinions about the death penalty. We suspect from
earlier work in these transcripts that questioning about death penalty opinions
may be an area requiring particular attention.
Compare, for example, the following two transcript excerpts. They
involve the same prosecutor, but different potential jurors, concerning their
views about the death penalty. The first except comes from voir dire of a
white juror.123
Prosecutor: Do you have feelings about either [life imprisonment without parole or the
death penalty]?
White Juror: I’m kind of against the death penalty, but it’s in our system.
Prosecutor: Can you tell me a little about what makes you feel that way?
White Juror: I don’t know. Just – I mean to kill somebody seems wrong. But if
somebody killed somebody . . . they could get the death penalty if that’s what the finding
was.
Prosecutor: If I’m hearing you correctly, it sounds like you’re opposed to killing, period.
And that if you were a jury member, even though you were generally opposed to killing,
you could consider both possible punishments?
White Juror: Yes, sir.
Prosecutor: And you could vote for the death penalty even though you’re not really in
favor of it, if that’s the law . . . . You could still vote for it?
White Juror: Yes, sir.

The prosecutor passed this juror, but struck the black juror whose exchange
with the prosecutor appears in the next transcript excerpt.124
Prosecutor: Could you tell me what your thoughts or feelings are about both of those
punishments, life imprisonment without parole and the death penalty?
Black Juror: I believe if you commit a crime, you deserve your punishment. And if it’s
the death penalty, I think you should get it. I really—I don’t feel it’s right, but if it’s the
law, it’s the law. That’s how I feel.
Prosecutor: So personal preferences, as opposed to what the law is, you don’t feel that
the death penalty is an appropriate punishment?

122

See Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 2, at 1531, tbl. 5.
Transcript of Jury Selection at 1018–19, State v. Williams, No. 01 CRS 63278 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Nov. 8, 2004).
124
Id.
123
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Black Juror: um, I . . .
Prosecutor: Or I shouldn’t say that it’s “appropriate.” You just don’t think it’s right to
have the death penalty? . . . From your personal point of view, regardless of what the
law . . . is, do you think that you have some personal reservation about the death
penalty?
Black Juror: No.
Prosecutor: If you had your druthers, would you rather not sit on a case where the death
penalty might be an appropriate punishment or might be a punishment that you had to
consider?
Black Juror: It wouldn’t matter.

The prosecutor is faced with very similar assertions by jurors in the very
same case: they personally do not favor the death penalty, but believe that the
law must be followed regardless of their personal beliefs. The prosecutor
follows up these assertions, however, with quite different tactics. In the first
instance, the prosecutor engages in a process known as “rehabilitation” of the
juror, providing the juror through leading questions with an answer that
reconciles the juror’s discomfort with capital punishment with the prospect
of imposing it. The prosecutor focuses on the juror’s stated respect for the
law as it stands. In response to the second juror, however, the prosecutor
focuses on the juror’s personal beliefs and suggests that she would prefer not
to serve.
This work with conversation profiles focuses our attention again on
those parts of these transcripts. A next step might be to look for the codes
included in the “conflict” component of the conversation profile within the
section of the transcripts addressing death penalty reservations to see if
patterns emerge. The codes capture expressions of concern, criticism,
disapproval or disagreement. They include leading questions. The transcript
sections excerpted above include utterances that would be coded within this
category.
The second juror reported that he knew the defendant. Unlike death
penalty reservations, we did not target jurors for inclusion in this study based
on knowledge of trial participants. We would not have known to look for
“conflict” codes in these parts of the conversation. This too may be fruitful
in understanding how trial participants seek information and how the
behavior varies by race.
It might also be fruitful to compare the conversation profiles in cases
with a larger proportion of black venire members to those with a smaller
proportion. Profiles might also vary between especially aggravated cases and
those, like Badgett’s, that are less aggravated. Each of the subprojects
presented here are intended to demonstrate the capacity of the coded text to
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address the question that underlies the project as a whole.
V. DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
This research makes two significant contributions to the literature. First,
it adapts a rigorous and exacting method of conversation analysis to the legal
setting. This method provides the tools to subject the elusive process of jury
selection to systematic review. Second, by using this method, this research
then provides a first look at the actual questioning of potential jurors that
precedes the decision to seat or strike a juror, or to excuse her for cause.
We undertook this project in light of both clear evidence of racial
disparities in jury selection in the underlying data and prosecutors’ earnest
claims that race does not enter their minds when picking a jury. Our intensive
work with the jury selection transcripts brought subtle instances of disparate
questioning to our attention; these instances in turn raised a question about
the role of subtle psychological processes in exacerbating and perpetuating
race effects.
Consider the transcript sections above—did the prosecutor engage in
this disparate behavior knowingly? Did the judge and defense counsel hear
this difference and not intervene? We suspect not. This shift seems
exceedingly subtle, especially when compared to the differential questioning
the Court addressed in Miller-El, which may serve as a kind of public
benchmark.125 Comparing transcript excerpts like those raised our concern
that more subtle disparities in the process of questioning jurors may
contribute to the disparate exercise of the kinds of peremptory strikes
documented in our earlier research. Moreover, the differences in how
prosecutors talk to jurors of different races may be more subtle, but also more
pervasive, than the example we present above, and a better understanding of
disparate behavior may strengthen judicial oversight.
RIAS coding provided a method for systematic analyses of discourse.
RIAS characterizes precisely the verbal interactions that occur in a
conversation and the context in which they occur.126 RIAS, however, was

125

In Miller-El, prosecutors deployed a “graphic description” of how death-sentenced
prisoners were executed in Texas, intended to increase the potential juror’s reservations about
the death penalty, with 53% of black jurors but only 6% of white jurors. David C. Baldus,
Catherine M. Grosso, Robert Dunham, George Woodworth & Richard Newell, Statistical
Proof of Racial Discrimination in the Use of Peremptory Challenges: The Impact and Promise
of the Miller-El Line of Cases, As Reflected in the Experience of One Philadelphia Capital
Case, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1425, 1436 (2012) (citing Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 260
(2005)).
126
See generally Roter & Larson, supra note 17 (2001).
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developed to capture nuances of medical conversations rather than those
examining jurors for criminal trials.127 Traditional RIAS coding categories
had been tailored to analyze exchanges that involved different objectives and
motivations than those of jury selection.
We revised the codes to reflect the content and context of legal
proceedings. This methodology provides a systematic look at the actual
process of jury selection. This paper presents the project as a whole. We
expect to present additional findings in the future. In the meantime, we
expect that the adapted RIAS codes may provide useful to legal researchers.
The RIAS methodology has been tested and refined for decades in the
public health context;128 ours is the first study that adapts it to the legal
setting. The new methods open new avenues for research, but also suggest
caution. The data presented here is a first step in untangling the nuances of
conversations leading to the decision to strike, pass, or excuse a juror for
cause, and to provide an important foundation for future research.

127
128

See supra Part II; Roter & Larson, supra note 64 (2002).
See supra Part II.C.
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APPENDIX 1. DIRECTORY OF TEXT CODES
(Adapted from Roter Interaction Analysis System Codebook.
http://riasworks.com)
1.  

Code
Agreement

Tag
Agree

2.  

Approve—Direct

Approve

3.  

Asks for Permission

?Perm

4.  

Asks for Reassurance

?Reassure

5.  

Asks for
Understanding

?Understand

6.  

Back-Channel
Responses
(Attorney/Court Only)

BC

Definition
Signs of agreement or
understanding.
Compliments directed to
the other person present or
showing of gratitude or
appreciation. Any
expression of approval,
praising, rewarding or
showing respect or
admiration directed to the
other.
Questions that ask for
permission to proceed.
Questions of concern that
convey the need or desire
to be reassured or
encouraged. Voice tone,
intonation and emotional
content may help
distinguish questions that
ask for reassurance from
other questions.
Mechanism by which the
speaker checks with the
other to see if information
that was just said has been
followed or understood
(i.e., in essence asking,
“Do you understand what
I’m saying?”).
Indicators of sustained
interest, attentive listening
or encouragement when
the listener does not hold
or take the speaking floor.
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Bid for Repetition

Tag
Bid

8.  

Checks for
Understanding

Check

9.  

Closed [Case Specific
Legal] Information
Question
Closed [Case Specific
Legal] Opinion
Question

[?]CS

11.  

Closed [General Legal]
Information Question

[?]GL

12.  

Closed [General Legal]
Opinion Question

[?]ØGL

13.  

Closed [Personal
Legal] Information
Question
Closed [Personal
Legal] Opinion
Question
Closed [Personal]
Information Question

[?]PL

7.  

10.  

14.  
15.  

[?]ØCS

[?]ØPL
[?]P

727
Definition
Request for repetition of
the other’s previous
statement. Bids are used
when words or statements
have not been clearly
heard, and therefore need
repetition, and are often
signs of perceptual
difficulties.
Mechanisms by which the
speaker re-states
information to check for
accuracy or to confirm a
shared understanding of
the facts being discussed
(i.e., in essence asking,
“Do I understand what you
are saying?” “Do I have it
right?” or “Am I on the
right track?”).
Asks closed question about
case specific facts &
knowledge.
Asks closed opinion
question about case
specific facts &
knowledge.
Asks closed question about
general legal facts &
knowledge.
Asks closed opinion
question about general
legal facts & knowledge.
Asks closed question about
personal legal facts &
knowledge.
Asks closed opinion
question about personal
legal facts & knowledge.
Asks closed question about
personal facts &
knowledge.
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16.  

Code
Closed [Personal]
Opinion Question

Tag
[?]ØP

17.  

Compliment (General)

Comp

18.  

Concern

Concern

19.  

Criticism (General)

Crit

[Vol. 107

Definition
Asks closed opinion
question about personal
facts & knowledge.
Compliments directed to
the group in general or to
others not involved in the
exchange showing
gratitude or appreciation.
Any expression of
approval, praise, or
showing respect or
admiration directed to the
group in general.
A statement that indicates
that a condition or event is
serious, worrisome,
distressing or deserving
special attention and is of
particular concern now
during the encounter.
Voice tone, intonation or
verbal content may
disclose that worries,
concerns, events or
uncertainties are of
immediate concern.
Includes statements that
ask for pardon and indicate
concern for the other.
Any indication of
disapproval, complaint,
rejection, coolness, or
disbelief directed toward
the group in general or to
others not involved in the
exchange.
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Disapprove or
Disagreement (Direct)

Tag
Dis

21.  

Empathy/Legitimizing
Statements

Emp

22.  

Gives [Case Specific
Legal] Information
Gives [Case Specific
Legal] Opinion
Gives [General Legal]
Information
Gives [General Legal]
Opinion
Gives [Personal Legal]
Information
Gives [Personal Legal]
Opinion
Gives [Personal]
Information
Gives [Personal]
Opinion
Laughs, Tells Jokes

GivesCS

20.  

23.  
24.  
25.  
26.  
27.  
28.  
29.  
30.  

GivesØCS
GivesGL
GivesØGL
GivesPL
GivesØPL
GivesP
GivesØP
Laugh

729
Definition
Any indication of
disapproval, criticism,
complaint, rejection,
coolness or disbelief
directed to the other person
present. Statements that
contradict or refute
something said by the
other, or imply
disagreement with or
rejection of the other’s
hypotheses, ideas or
opinions.
Statements that paraphrase,
interpret, name or
recognize the emotional
state of the other person.
Statements that indicate
that the other’s emotional
situation, actions, or
thoughts are
understandable and
normal.
Gives case specific
information.
Gives case specific
opinion.
Gives general legal
information.
Gives general legal
opinion.
Gives personal legal
information.
Gives personal legal
opinion.
Gives personal
information.
Gives personal opinion.
Friendly jokes, trying to
amuse or entertain, light
banter. Laughter and
nervous laughter.
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Code
Leading Question—
Negative

Tag
LNeg

32.  

Leading Question—
Positive

LPos

33.  

Open [Case Specific
Legal] Information
Question
Open [Case Specific
Legal] Opinion
Question

?CS

35.  

Open [General Legal]
Information Question

?GL

36.  

Open [General Legal]
Opinion Question

?ØGL

37.  

Open [Personal Legal]
Information Question

?PL

38.  

Open [Personal Legal]
Opinion Question

?ØPL

39.  

Open [Personal]
Information Question

?P

40.  

Open [Personal]
Opinion Question

?ØP

31.  

34.  

?ØCS

[Vol. 107

Definition
Suggests an answer.
Usually calls for yes/no
response. Adds/assumes
information that the juror
had not already provided,
and
makes the juror appear less
fit to serve
Suggests an answer.
Usually calls for yes/no
response. Adds/assumes
information that the juror
had not already provided,
and
makes the juror appear
more fit to serve.
Asks open question about
case specific facts &
knowledge.
Asks open opinion
question about case
specific facts &
knowledge.
Asks open question about
general legal facts &
knowledge.
Asks open opinion
question about general
legal facts & knowledge.
Asks open question about
personal legal facts &
knowledge.
Asks open opinion
question about personal
legal facts & knowledge.
Asks open question about
personal facts &
knowledge.
Asks open opinion
question about personal
facts & knowledge.
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Code
Orient

Tag
Orient

42.  

Partnership Statements
(Attorney/Court Only)

Partner

43.  

Personal Remarks/
Social Chit Chat
Reassure, Encourages
or Shows Optimism

Chat

45.  

Self-Disclosure
Statements
(Attorney/Court Only)

SDis

46.  

Transition Words

Tran

41.  

44.  

R/O

731
Definition
Gives instructions.
Statements that tell the
other person what is about
to happen, what is
expected, or serve to orient
the other to the major
topics of discussion or
procedures.
Statements that convey
alliance with the other in
terms of help and support.
Greetings and goodbyes.
Social conversation.
A statement that indicates
optimism, encouragement,
relief of worry or
reassurance. Includes
statements that show an
awareness of the other’s
feelings in a positive
upbeat way, or respond to a
request for reassurance.
Statements that describe
the speaker’s personal
experiences in areas that
have legal and/or
emotional relevance for the
venire member. Selfdisclosure is the revealing
of a non-public personal
component.
Sentence fragments that
indicate movement to
another topic or area of
discussion, train of thought
or action. Includes
statements or fragments
that are place-holders, if
the utterance stands alone.
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APPENDIX 2. INITIAL CONVERSATION PROFILE DEFINITION
1.

Component
Data Gathering

Variables Included
Open [Case Specific Legal] Information Question
Open [Case Specific Legal] Opinion Question
Open [General Legal] Information Question
Open [General Legal] Opinion Question
Open [Personal Legal] Information Question
Open [Personal Legal] Opinion Question
Open [Personal] Information Question
Open [Personal] Opinion Question
Closed [Case Specific Legal] Information
Question
Closed [Case Specific Legal] Opinion Question
Closed [General Legal] Information Question
Closed [General Legal] Opinion Question
Closed [Personal Legal] Information Question
Closed [Personal Legal] Opinion Question
Closed [Personal] Information Question
Closed [Personal] Opinion Question
Checks for Understanding

2.

Education/Outreach

Gives [Case Specific Legal] Information
Gives [Case Specific Legal] Opinion
Gives [General Legal] Information
Gives [General Legal] Opinion
Gives [Personal Legal] Information
Gives [Personal Legal] Opinion
Gives [Personal] Information
Gives [Personal] Opinion
Orient

3.

Relationship Building

Approve (Direct)
Asks for Permission
Asks for Reassurance
Asks for Understanding
Compliment (General)
Empathy/Legitimizing Statements
Laughs, Tells Jokes
Partnership Statements (Attorney/Court Only)
Personal Remarks/Social Chit Chat
Reassure, Encourages or Shows Optimism
Self-Disclosure

4.

Conflict

Concern
Criticism (General)
Disapprove or Disagreement (Direct)
Leading Negative
Leading Positive

